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"If you take somethingfrom Mother Earth, 
she will retaliate" 
LEGENDS FROM THE 
MT. MULLIGAN 
COAL MINE DISASTER 
by Peter Bell 
Read at a Meeting of the Society on 26 June 1980 
This paper will look at the way the process of recording and inter-
predng history can be distorted by the creation of legends which 
become mixed with the historical evidence. I propose to comment on 
the legends which have formed about the Mount Mulligan disaster of 
1921, and will preface the paper with a brief descripdon of events at 
Mount Mulligan. 
Mount MuUigan overlooks the Hodgkinson River, about 100km. 
nearly due west of Cairns. The mountain is an impressive natural spec-
tacle, with miles of vertical sandstone cliffs paralleling the valley. Its dis-
coverer and namesake, Jamds Mulligan, described it as "a mountain 
once seen, never to be forgotten".' The Hodgkinson goldfield had 
been the scene of significant mining activity in the nineteenth century, 
but by the early years of this century was in severe decline: tin and 
copper mining activity had come to dominate the Cairns region. 
In 1907 coal deposits were found underlying Mount Mulligan. The 
discovery was principally of interest to the mining companies of the 
region, who saw distinct advantages in reducing smelting costs by 
using locally produced coke. After a period of prospecting and political 
manoeuvring, the Chillagoe company commenced development work 
at Mount Mulligan in 1911. A railway was completed in 1914, and the 
mine commenced large-scale production in 1915. 
By that time the Chillagoe company was in serious financial diffi-
culty, and had closed the smelters at Chillagoe. Mount Mulligan's coal 
was used largely for the Cairns district railway market throughout the 
First World War. 
Mr. Peter Bell, of the History Department of James Cook University, Townsville, has 
had his Arts honours thesis on the Mount Mulligan disaster published by that university. 
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In 1918, parliament finally accepted a proposal for State acquisition 
of the ChiUagoe mineral enterprise: the company's copper mines, rail-
ways and smelters were acquired by the State in 1919, leaving the 
Mount Mulligan coal mine the sole working asset in the Chillagoe 
company's control. The mine was developed on modern principles for 
the time, and with a modest but steadily increasing production of over 
20,000 tons of coal per year, had achieved a substantial position in the 
region's economic activities by 1921. 
On the morning of 19 September 1921, just as the town's school 
children were assembled on parade before beginning the day's lessons, 
a massive explosion occurred in the Mount Mulligan coal mine. All 75 
men working underground were killed; a heroic rescue effort that 
began within minutes of the explosion and persisted for five days with 
the assistance of several hundred volunteers from the surrounding dis-
trict proving quite fruitless. 
This was the greatest land disaster Queenlslanid has seen, and its local 
impact has never been paralleled elsewhere in Australia: the men killed 
in the explosion were about a quarter of the entire population of the 
town; about one adult in three; or one adult male in every two. They 
left about 40 widows and 83 fatherless children. 
Wheeling a coffin from the mine. 
(North Queensland Register) 
In the aftermath the State's mine rescue service was shown to be 
totally helpless, political controversy flared over the distribution of 
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relief funds, a Royal Commission exposed wanton neglect of safety 
regulations in the mine but itself produced a strangely one-sided 
report, carefully selecting its victims; and the Chillagoe company's utter 
financial ruin was accomplished. The mine was acquired by the State in 
1923, and it achieved further notoriety on the fringe of the Mungana 
scandal. Mount Mulligan lingered as an unprofitable State enterprise 
supplying local railway coal until 1957 when the mine closed, the 
townspeople were moved to Collinsville, and the site was stripped of 
useful machinery and left to the rubber vine. It will be apparent even 
from this terse account that the story contains many fruitful seeds from 
which legends might grow. 
FORMING OF LEGENDS 
Three years ago I wrote an account of the Mount Mulligan disaster.^ 
During the course of my research I was told many stories about the 
disaster, and also recalled others I had heard since childhood, purporting 
to describe the circumstances surrounding the Mount Mulligan 
explosion. I realised at an early stage of research that many of the 
stories in circulation were simply not correct - that they deviated to 
some extent from the events that could be identified in the process of 
historical enquiry. My initial reaction was to cast such tales aside 
impatiently, but I found this impossible for two reasons. First, because 
they were repeated so regularly and consistently that they demon-
strated there exists a body of belief which, although inaccurate, is more 
solidly established in folklore than the events which really occurred; 
and second, because in reading accounts of other mine disasters at 
widely separated times and places I found similar stories repeated, 
showing a universal tendency for legends to form about such events.^ 
These stories form a historical pattern of their own, distinct from 
but parallel to the objectively verifiable events of the Mount Mulligan 
disaster. I believe the historian must accept that there exist two levels 
of historical reality - there is first the level of what "really" happened, 
and beyond that the level of what is popularly believed to have 
happened. The second level must be accepted on very different terms, 
but in some circumstances its implications for the historian may be just 
as important as those of the first level. 
In describing some of the legends that have arisen from the events 
of the Mount Mulligan disaster, my interest is in the links that connect 
the events and the folklore, so I will dissect each in search of its con-
necdon with the first level of reality. If I appear to be deflating some of 
the legends rather cruelly, most of them will rise again in stature 
toward the end of this paper. 
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The principal legends may be summarised briefly: 
1. the "distance heard" - folklore has seized on the audible range of 
the Mount Mulligan explosion, and carried it forth to amazing 
distances; 
2. the "fire in the mine" - the story is told that the Mount Mulli-
gan mine was abandoned with vast reserves of coal intact 
because a raging fire prevented entry after the disaster; 
3. the "sole survivor" - one man on his way to work was smitten 
by foreboding, and returned home on the morning of the 
disaster; 
4. the "numbers on the mountain" - after the disaster the date 
appeared in mystic numerals on the mountain wall overlooking 
the town; 
5. the "spirit prophesying destruction" - an Aboriginal spirit threat-
ened to destroy the mine in retaliation; for interference with the 
mountain; 
6. the "man never found" - one miner was never accounted for 
after the explosion; in some versions of the story he was the 
man who caused the disaster, in others his ghost haunts the 
mine.'' 
The simplest legend, and the one most easily checked against the his-
torical evidence, is the distance from Mount Mulligan at which the 
explosion was heard. Oral and written sources variously suggest the 
sound was audible at Thornborough, Kingsborough, Mount Carbine, 
Mount Molloy, Mareeba, Herberton, Newellton, Cairns and Towns-
ville. I have named these towns in decreasing order of probability - for 
the explosion to be heard in Townsville, at a distance of over 300km, 
would involve catastrophic destruction at its source. This version of the 
legend originates with someone who had only a vague knowledge of 
the extent of the explosion's damage. 
The more reasonable claims can be compared with first-hand evid-
ence. There can be no doubt that everyone in Mount Mulligan heard 
the explosion, as did a few people in nearby towns. Several of the wit-
nesses at the subsequent Royal Commission began their evidence by 
stating where they were at the time of the disaster, and how they first 
heard of it. Thus: "I was at Thornborough and I heard an explosion",-
and a similar account from Kingsborough.' As Thornborough and 
Kingsborough were respectively 16 and 19km from Mount Mulhgan 
- the mountain can be seen from the site of Thornborough - it can be 
accepted that the explosion was heard and correctly identified by 
people in the open up to 20km away. It was not heard by the miners 
underground at Kingsborough.' 
93 
The Mount Mulligan mine entrance before 1921. 
(Mrs. Mary Wardle) 
Further afield at Mareeba, 60km away, there is the evidence of Bill 
Matthews, a Mount Mulligan coal miner: "I was at Mareeba railway 
station, and I heard the Mount Mulligan colliery had been blown up".^ 
A Mount Mulligan surface worker also in Mareeba that morning 
"heard about the explosion".' These two men above all others might be 
expected to put the correct interpretation on an explosion distantly 
heard from the direction of the coal mine. They claimed only second-
hand knowledge, and it seems most unlikely the explosion was heard at 
anywhere near 60km, rendering all more distant claims strongly 
suspect. Chillagoe is approximately the same distance from Mount 
Mulligan as Mareeba, in almost the opposite direction, and was in 1921 
the most populous town of the district; yet there seem to be no claims 
of hearing the explosion there. Mount Molloy'" and Mount Carbine" 
both seem improbably distant at about 50km, but unlike Mareeba are 
more or less in line with the mine entrance with no major topo-
graphical obstacle intervening. In the absence of first-hand evidence 
from either town, I will leave them as unsubstantiated. Further, I am 
iiiclined to doubt any claim much beyond 20km, because the noise of 
the explosion was not of unmistakable magnitude, even at close 
range.'2 
Several people in the town of Mount Mulligan itself heard the 
explosion but were not immediately alarmed by it. Doris Watson, 
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working in the company office 500m from the mine entrance, thought 
it was the noise of routine blasting until she saw through the window 
that people outside were running toward the mine.'^ Bruce Mackey, 
also indoors about 1000m from the mine at the moment of the 
explosion, was likewise undisturbed by the sound, believing it to be 
caused by workmen blasting clay for the brickworks.''' The one first-
hand account I have from a person in the open at the time emphasises 
the sight of the dust cloud erupting from the mine entrance rather than 
the sound which followed some seconds later.'^ The more fanciful 
accounts of long-distance audibility may stem from two sources -
confusion after the event with the sound of local blasting, an under-
standable error in any mining town; or a deep-seated urge for vicarious 
involvement in the disaster. 
MINE CLOSED BRIEFLY 
The story is also told that the mine closed permanently after the 
disaster, leaving huge reserves of high-grade coal in the ground; more-
over that the explosion ignited a raging fire in the coal-seam, which 
no-one dared approach closely enough to extinguish. Most of this 
legend arises from ignorance of local events and of the nature of coal 
fires. While the Mount Mulligan mine closed briefly as a consequence 
of the 1921 disaster, it was operating normally within four months, and 
continued to produce coal until 1957. The story of permanent closure 
must have its origins after 1957, since it could not have been re-told in 
the face of the mine's publicly known operation in the intervening 36 
years. 
The "fire in the mine" variant may be the result of confusing events 
of 1957 with those of 1921. There was a fire underground at Mount 
Mulligan after the disaster - a fire in the sense the term has in coal 
mines; an intensely hot, relatively smokeless smouldering within the 
coal seam. It was extinguished five days after the explosion, after the 
bodies of the victims had been removed." There was also spontaneous 
combustion in the mine in 1957, which was one of the several causes 
of its final closure." The latter heating was dealt with sensationally by 
the Brisbane press: "Mystery Fire in State Mine"; "Still Fight Mine 
Fire".'* Newspaper reports frequently serve to reinforce common 
folklore themes of this kind - after the Box Flat mine explosion of 
1972, the Courier Mail reported that "millions of tons of coal" were 
burning underground in the sealed mine," a statement which on a 
moment's reflection seems both highly improbable and totally unveri-
fiable. The improbable and the unverifiable frequently rub shoulders in 
folklore, but one is surprised to find them on a newspaper page!! 
It is tempting to believe the "fire in the mine" stories arose from 
combination of the coal-seam fires of 1921 and 1957 into one event, if 
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legend formation can be assumed to work as simply and logically as 
that. The added element that huge coal reserves remain under Mount 
Mulligan has given rise in recent years to rumours that some large 
unnamed mining company is about to re-open the coal mine. Such talk 
is endemic in almost every abandoned mining area, and perhaps 
requires no further examination, except that there are identifiable 
origins for the tales of vast reserves at Mount MulHgan. 
The first thorough geological survey of Mount Mulligan was carried 
out in 1911 by Assistant Government Geologist L C Ball. He estimated 
the coal reserves by multiplying the cross-sectional area of the exposed 
seams by the total area of the coal measures, and reported "at least 
84,000,000 tons of coal" under the mountain. However, he also 
pointed out the obvious shortcomings of this rough-and-ready com-
putation: "It is risky, in view of the small amount of prospecting work 
done, to attempt to estimate the quantity of coal to be depended on . . 
."20 People with an interest in promoting the mine were prepared to 
take that risk. The mine manager, G.B. Stones, rounded Ball's estimate 
to the nearest ten million tons upward, informing a Cairns Post reporter 
that the Mount Mulligan reserves were ninety milHon tons.^' The 
Shire Chairman, William Crowley, raised the bid a month later by pre-
dicting production of 600,000 tons annually for 200 years - implying 
reserves of 120 million tons of coal.22 In fairness to these observers it 
must be pointed out that they and the Caims Post were doing their best 
at the time to attract Government funds for a railway to Mount Mulli-
gan. But these exaggerated claims may provide some of the material on 
which are based the stories of vast untouched coal deposits. These 
estimates were all grossly excessive. Diamond drill tests at Mount 
Mulligan in 1951 revealed reserves in the order of 750,000 tons.^^ 
Total production at Mount Mulligan was 853,000 tons.^'^ It seems 
there was never much more than one-and-a-half million tons of usable 
coal under the mountain. 
One of the more romantic legends told after many disasters is that 
concerning the "sole survivor" who was warned by a premonition not 
to go to the mine that day. If there was in fact such a person in Mount 
Mulligan on the morning of the explosion, the problem for the 
historian Hes in determining which of the crowd of "survivors" he was! 
At least seven miners survived because they were not at work at the 
dme of the disaster; but none of them pubHcly claimed precognizance 
at the time. 
WilHam Westbury and Alfred Leary were in bed suffering from 
influenza," Frederick Larsen had been "off sick for a week", '^^  Bill 
Matthews was "laid up with a bad leg",^' and another man named 
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Spiers was at home, ill.^ s Albert Jones and Arthur Griffiths had recently 
been injured in mining accidents: both were in Mareeba hospital.^' In 
addition there were at least half a dozen people who although not 
miners might have had reason to be in the mine: James Watson the 
manager, Jim Harris the engineer and his carpenter brother Jack, 
Norman Eraser the electrician , George Morrison the tool-sharpener. 
The "sole survivor" legend may have crystallised around the personal 
story of any one of these dozen or more men, or it may simply be a 
more universal theme locally adopted: I find it significant that although 
I have heard of the "sole survivor" of Mount Mulligan many times, I 
have never been told his name. 
The stories of narrow escapes from destruction seem to have wide 
appeal. After the Appin colliery disaster in New South Wales last year, 
the Brisbane Telegraph within hours published a large front page 
photograph of a miner whose newsworthiness lay in the fact that he 
"came out of the colliery a few minutes before the explosion''.^" The 
Courier Mail's next issue gave similar prominence to a man who had 
been ill and stayed home from work.^' At Mount Kembla, legends of 
premonition have survived from 1902 until the present, but with an 
odd variation - the stories there concern miners who went to work 
and were killed despite forebodings.^^ There would be no point in a 
"sole survivor" legend at Mount Kembla, as over 160 men working 
underground survived the disaster. 
Strangely, there seems to be no folklore attached to the reverse cases 
at Mount Mulligan - the men who should not have been at work, but 
were. Sam McColm had been off work for some weeks through ill-
ness, and although still unwell, returned to the mine on the morning of 
the explosion.33 A retired miner named Bill Cole was standing in for 
one of the men in hospital.^'* Both were killed Tom Evans, the under-
ground manager, probably had no real need to be in the mine at the 
time of the disaster, but as a result of going conscientiously to work in 
his underground office, he was among those killed While these stories 
have a poignancy that might be expected to form legends around 
them, this has not occurred. Perhaps legends attach more readily to 
good fortune than bad. 
N U M E R A L S O N M O U N T A I N 
One folktale can readily be verified by the visitor to Mount Mulli-
gan. The story is told that after the disaster the date "1921" appeared in 
enormous numerals on the mountain face, and the inscription can still 
be read with some difficulty. The date is formed by weathered hollows 
and water marks on the sandstone escarpment, and need not be attrib-
uted to any supernatural intervention - it can be seen only when the 
sun is at the right angle and the viewer is in the correct frame of mind. 
It is revealing that this empirically verifiable story is the only one of 
the Mount Mulligan legends which is told by former residents of the 
town. The date on the mountain was apparently first noticed in the 
weeks following the disaster, and subsequently accepted as a local 
curiosity - the local people did not attach any supernatural significance 
to the inscription, although outsiders repeating the story often do. 
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Mount Mulligan at the time of the disaster. 
(Qld. Govt. Mining Journal) 
In recent years a former resident attempted to provide a mundane 
explanation for the inscription, by recaHing that it had been carved by a 
visiting circus troupe some months before the disaster.^^ pj^ s story is in 
part confirmed by another witness who agrees that the circus painted 
"King Carnival Co June 1921" on the escarpment, but insists that their 
inscription was on a much smaller scale, and rapidly disappeared.^' 
Certainly the present numerals are not the work of man, but the con-
flict between these two accounts may provide some insight into the 
ways in which independent but vaguely similar events may with the 
passage of time emerge as one piece of folklore. Unchallenged, the 
story might in the future take the form that the hazy date on the 
mountain is the weathered remains of the work of an extremely 
energetic circus company. 
There is a legend that Mount Mulligan was the home of an evil pres-
ence known in Aboriginal belief as Iku. Local Aborigines had warned 
the early European residents of Mount MulHgan that Iku would exact 
vengeance if the white men interfered with the mountain, and Iku was 
seen sitting in trees around the mine a few days before the disaster. 
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Like most good prophecies, this one was not recorded until after the 
prophesied event. It first appeared in a paper by Frank Richards, 
published by the Queensland Museum in 1926.^' Richards was the 
head-teacher at Mount Mulligan, a member of a prominent local 
family, and a gentleman-scholar of some ability. His first-hand know-
ledge of the Hodgkinson Aborigines was unquestionably extensive, 
but the timing of his publication makes the threat of spiritual retribu-
tion untenable in historical evidence. 
It is unsurprising, though, that such a story should be repeated, for 
the idea of an evil spirit in the mine, or retribution by the earth itself, is 
very ancient among miners and persists to the present. Throughout 
Europe, where most Mount Mulligan miners were born, there were, 
until quite recently, traditional beHefs in evil or mischievous beings in 
the mines - kobolds, knockers, john-o-goblins - who engaged in spite-
ful pranks or who on occasion brought calamity upon miners. The first 
modern mining text-book, De Re Metallica, by the sixteenth century 
German engineer and metaOurgist Agricola, contains in the middle of 
an entirely practical chapter on problems encountered in underground 
mines the startling passage: "In some of our mines . . . there are other 
pernicious pests. These are demons of ferocious aspect, about which I 
have spoken in my book De Animantibus Subterraneis. Demons of this 
kind are expelled and put to flight by prayer and fasting".^* The sense 
of hostility to the miner's presence has by no means vanished. After the 
Kianga disaster of 1975, a miner's wife commented: "My husband says 
that if you take something from Mother Earth, she will retaliate";^' 
and an almost identical belief was recorded at Appin last year: "Every 
time you put a hole down in that ground, mother earth sets about 
filling it in again".'"' 
This ancient fear of retribution by forces beneath the earth is 
perhaps echoed in the common disaster theme of atonement - the 
legends of a victim especially singled out in some way. At Mount 
Mulligan this takes the form of a story that one miner disappeared 
without trace in the explosion. The "man never found" legend has an 
obvious basis in fact - there was a man missing after the disaster, as the 
Royal Commission reported: "If the cavil sheets available are correct, 
there is still one body unrecovered. . .""" Until very recent years, the 
organisation of most mines was so haphazard that in the event of an 
accident underground, the number of miners involved was rarely 
known with any precision, and the possibility of bodies remaining 
undiscovered was very real. Immediately after the Mount Mulligan 
explosion, estimates of the number of miners underground ranged 
from 60 to lOO.''^  At the conclusion of the rescue work, it seemed 
established that 75 men had been killed, but only 74 bodies had been 
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recovered, as the Royal Commissioners noted. Although an attempt 
was made to dismiss the discrepancy as an error in counting the dead, 
the story of the missing miner immediately took firm root in folklore. 
This story should have had a very brief career, however, for five 
months after the disaster, when the Mount Mulligan mine had 
reopened, the remains of the seventy-fifth man were found.« The 
story of the "man never found" apparently had too much momentum 
by that time to be checked by an obscure news item reporting that the 
missing miner had unexpectedly turned up. As it was perpetuated in 
legend, the story gained strength from its association with a legend I 
mentioned earHer - that of the supernatural presence in the mine. 
G H O S T STORY 
In the months foHowing the disaster, these two themes were com-
bined by the new miners at Mount MuOigan into the story of 
"Morgan's Ghost". Edward Morgan was the miner to whom the Royal 
Commission attributed much of the blame for the Mount Mulligan 
explosion,"'' and the belief flourished that Morgan was the missing 
man - in some variants because his body had been blown into 
unrecognizable fragments by his proximity to the explosion's origin. 
This story is entirely unsatisfactory, and illustrates the remarkable 
ability of a legend to survive in the face of contradictory evidence. 
Twelve of the bodies recovered from the Mount MulHgan mine were 
not identified,''^ and thus there was no means of establishing the 
identity of the missing man; and in any case Morgan was one of the 
most easily identified men in the mine, since he alone was bearded, 
and his body recognised by that feature.'" 
If Morgan's body was identified, and his implied responsibility for 
the explosion not well established, why did folklore make him the 
spiritual presence haunting the mine? We know of Morgan that he was 
the only miner at Mount Mulligan who wore a beard. He was also a 
teetotaller:'" not a common attribute in the town, and he was 
described by the mine manager as "one of the best men in the mine 
and one of the most careful".''* Without speculating further, for there 
were other elements of Morgan's temperament which seem distinctive, 
but are less well substantiated, we can confidently state that Morgan 
was different, and therefore a suitable scapegoat: if someone had to be 
singled out, who better than the bearded, conscientious teetotaHer? The 
most interesting aspect of the "Morgan's Ghost" legend is its demon-
stration of the need for folklore to single someone out from an anony-
mous group, and its ability to thrive on intuitive belief, despite firm 
evidence to the contrary. 
100 
All of these Mount Mulligan stories have elements in common. Each 
on investigation bears some resemblance to verifiable events, the 
teHing of which presumably provided the original basis on which the 
story grew. Those events have been distorted with the re-telling of the 
story, but the process of distortion usually follows an identifiable 
process: 
1. The event may simply be exaggerated; 
2. Different events at one place may be confused, or events at 
separate places may be combined into one; 
3. A specific event may acquire archetypal overtones as universal 
themes are added to the original story. 
All of these distortions occur as stories circulate in the pubHc 
domain, through repeated retelling over a period of time, not neces-
sarily very long, and legends arising in these ways will undoubtedly be 
encountered by historians researching any topic whose evidence has 
been transmitted wholly or partly by oral means. They should 
normally be sifted out in the process of historical enquiry, as the histor-
ian exercises his critical judgment as to the relative plausibihty of 
different versions of an event. The historian is also expected to make 
every effort to explore all the available first-hand evidence of an event, 
an effort which is not demanded of every citizen repeating a folktale. 
I do not wish to imply that the historian's task is to pour buckets of 
cold water over good honest folklore. On the contrary; I believe part 
of the historian's responsibility is to preserve legends, but with proper 
respect both for the legends and the historical record. Folklore must be 
recognized and respected for what it is. Having identified a legend, and 
established that it differs from the objectively verifiable events it 
alludes to, there are three courses open to the historian: 
1. To repeat the legend uncritically. This does the historical record 
no service - an inaccurate story does not become more true 
simply by being embalmed in literature. It is in any case rather 
pointless, since most legends are circulating quite efficiently 
without the historian's assistance. 
2. To report objectively on the verifiable events, and leave out of 
the record those stories which are found to be wrong. This 
ensures factual accuracy, but makes for dull history. It also 
ignores an important aspect of historical events: that what people 
believe happened is often just as important in determining future 
events as what really did happen. The historian is quite free to 
disbelieve folklore, but he cannot ignore it as a social force, even 
when it is wrong. 
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3. To give both levels of historical memory - the legends and the 
verifiable events - and explain their discrepancies. This, I think, 
is the most responsible course. We need to know and understand 
folklore, but it must be seen in its proper context. 
The process of transmitting events into legend can itself provide 
useful information to the historian. Legends do not evolve around 
trivial events, and their very existence may point the way to things 
which require research. At the risk of misusing a medical analogy, I 
suggest that legends are the scar tissue of history: the legend is not the 
event itself but the long-lasting distorted evidence, recording roughly 
the location and severity of the original wound. The historian must be 
alert to its presence, but must not allow it to distract him from his 
larger task. 
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